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Abstract—In the factory of the future traditional and formerly
isolated Operational Technology (OT) hardware will become
connected with all kinds of networks. This leads to more
complex security challenges during design, deployment and use
of industrial control systems. As it is infeasible to perform
security tests on production hardware and it is expensive to build
hardware setups dedicated to security testing, virtualised testbeds
are gaining interest. We create a testbed based on a virtualised
factory which can be controlled by real and virtualised hardware.
This allows for a flexible evaluation of security strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Current Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have been de-
signed to monitor and control industrial processes in isolated
OT networks. With the advent of Industry 4.0 and the In-
dustrial Internet of Things (IIoT), these OT networks more
and more converge with other networks and the Internet. This
convergence increases functionality and effectiveness, while
reducing costs. However, this brings new vulnerabilities and
opens these networks to threats and attacks from the Internet.
However, applying traditional IT security solutions alone will
fail, as these solutions do not take into account the cyber and
physicial components of an ICS [1].
It is important to understand the potential effects of attacks
on critical infrastructure and how to defend them. For that, a
security assessment of OT systems is required, in the design
phase, but also when deployed. However, in most cases it
is not possible to run security tests on production systems
due to availability and performance concerns. For this reason,
it is necessary to build an experimental platform to develop
and evaluate cyber security solutions for OT environments.
This allows to conduct security tests, so that there is no
side effect on the production. However, constructing a testbed
is challenging even with the help of modern technologies,
as it can be difficult to obtain a realistic testbed scale and
configuration [2].
There are some criteria that needs to be considered in
testbed development phase. First of all, it is significantly
important that how accurately the testbed reproduces a real
system. In many cases, reproducing every details of a system
is not needed but the testbed should offer reasonable level of
realism. In this way, researchers may evaluate their hypothesis
on the testbed. In addition to that, experiments should be able
to produce statistically consistent results for the repetitions.
Also, testbed should provide isolation for the experiments so
that external activities do not affect the results [3].
In this paper, we present our OT security testbed based
on FACTORY I/O2 and OpenPLC3. The proposed testbed
provides a platform to implement and test security mechanisms
in a wide range of use cases, e.g., simulating complex attack
scenarios or creating a dataset by generating traffic from
a large number of devices. It allows to evaluate security
mechanisms and thus eases the research on OT security.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section
II gives an overview on related work in the area of ICS
security. The design goals and architecture of the testbed
are explained in Section III. The real-world implementation,
including setup, possible attacks and monitoring approaches
is described in Section IV. We conclude the paper in Section
V.
II. RELATED WORK
There have been several attempts to develop research
testbeds for industrial control systems. These testbed construc-
tions can be categorised into four groups based on the used
technologies as physical replication, simulation and emulation,
virtualisation, and hybrid testbeds.
To study the vulnerability of ICS systems, researchers at-
tempt to replicate the existing system in isolated environments
named physical replication testbeds [2]. In [4], a physical ICS
testbed is created and some attacks are performed to show
how the attacker may gain information from the environment.
However, the proposed testbed is not easily reproducible
and would require purchasing a lot of hardware. A power-
generation testbed consisting of Human-Machine-Interfaces
2https://factoryio.com/
3https://www.openplcproject.com/
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(HMIs), Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), and AC
and DC motor pairs has been developed for simulating the
electricity generation. In these testbeds, carrying out security
related tests and evaluating the vulnerabilities provides a high
degree of accuracy. However, it is difficult to reconfigure and
maintain real hardware and software in a testbed [5].
The second method to build a testbed is simulating and
emulating system components. For instance, network simula-
tion tools like ns2, OPNET, OMNet++, SSFnet, RINSE can
be used for simulating and emulating control traffic networks.
To simulate the communication of PLCs and other field
devices, tools like STEP7, RSEmulate, Modbus Rsim, Soft-
PLC are suitable. In order to model the physical processes,
Matlab, Modelica, Ptolemy, PowerWorld are possisble tools
[6]. Software based simulation is an easy and reusable way of
building testbeds. It enables deploying a rich set of scenarios
for security testing and evaluation. However, it does not reflect
the real vulnerabilities of the systems due to being limited to
how it is coded.
Virtualisation is not clearly defined in the area of ICS
research and often there is a smooth transition between sim-
ulation, emulation, and virtualisation. In most cases a testbed
is called virtual or virtualised if it contains some or all
components built in software. Virtualisation techniques, e.g.
VirtualBox, GENI, and PlanetLab, are mostly used for virtu-
alising control centers and communication components [2]. In
general, virtualisation is a good approach for obtaining a large-
scale realistic testbed. Carrying out security related tests on a
real automation hardware may be more realistic, but also more
expensive and less flexible. Thus, deploying environment-
specific, virtualised testbeds is getting interest [2].
Hybrid testbeds combine software and hardware compo-
nents. In [7], the authors simulate a chemical process in a
testbed called VTET that contains software and hardware
components. They also describe different attack scenarios
which are targeting the process to damage the physical devices.
Another hybrid testbed for studying cyberattacks was intro-
duced in [8]. It contains a lot of software components written
in python that can be combined with hardware communication
devices and are interoperable with control hardware.
III. TESTBED ARCHITECTURE
The main design goal for the testbed is a flexible architec-
ture that allows to combine multiple hardware and software
components while keeping the costs low. A managed Ethernet
switch provides the necessary configurable connectivity for
three types of components in the testbed: 1. factory entities,
2. controlling entities, 3. security entities.
A generic overview of the testbed is given in Figure 1. A
small factory can be built in FACTORY I/O which simulates
and renders an industry process, e.g., a conveyor belt and a
robot sorting the items arriving on the conveyor belt. Hardware
components of a factory like an HMI can be integrated via a
PLC or connected via ethernet if possible. As FACTORY I/O
offers a lot of different drivers for external controllers it can
be steered by Siemens PLC, Allen-Bradley PLC, Modbus,
OpenPLC PLC + components
IDS
FactoryIO
Attacker
Figure 1. Testbed Overview. Hosts running FACTORY I/O are directly
connected to the managed switch. Optionally physical PLCs and/or hosts
running OpenPLC are also connected on regular ports (black/solid), while
the IDS receives all produced traffic via a mirror port (red/dashed).
OPC-UA and others. This allows to add controlling entities
as hardware (PLC) and as software, with a lot of possible
host devices. To get the contol data sent over the network
to the monitoring and security entities, the switch mirrors all
traffic and forwards it them. A security entity can be any
kind of machine that runs some monitoring tool, software, or
an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). As it can be replaced
fexibly, we can employ several monitoring tools, anomaly
detection tools and even machine learning algorithms.
By connecting another host the switch an attacker that
already gained access to the network can be simulated. There
are multiple possible attacks in this scenario. The attacker
can monitor the traffic, learn communication patterns, disrupt
communications (DoS), and forge malicious control messages.
These can then disrupt the production, destroy equipment or
even cause harm to workers. Additional threats are espionage
and manipulations which increase the scrap rate gradually over
time while keeping a low profile.
IV. TESTBED IMPLEMENTATION
We built a testbed according to the architecture described in
Section III. Additionally, we focused on ease of demonstration
to highlight the impact of attacks to people unfamiliar with
OT. In the following, we describe our testbed in detail, show
how we successfully attacked the simulated factory and outline
monitoring solutions.
A. Setup
Abbildung 2 gives an overview on the hardware components
in our OT testbed. Our virtual factory in FACTORY I/O
runs on Windows on a regular Dell workstation. Another
identical machine is used to run monitoring software, i.e.,
an IDS as well as the anomaly detection scripts that we
describe later on. The automation workload is executed on one
physical PLC, a Siemens S7–1200 PLC, and three RasperryPis
running OpenPLC on Raspbian Linux. Additionally we added
a Siemens KTP400 HMI and a three-colored warning light. All
networked devices are connected via a managed switch from
Netgear with a mirror port the IDS is connected to. During
the attack simulation later on we added a Linux machine also
OpenPLC
Anomaly Detection
FactoryIO
Attacker
Netgear GS308T
Siemens S7-1200
+ KTP400 HMI
Figure 2. Hardware overview
connected to a regular port to match the conditions an attacker
would likely face.
We chose commodity hardware for both the Windows
computers as well as the machines running OpenPLC and the
switch. The Siemens PLC and HMI were integrated to offer
a physical feedback link. We feel, that this mixture between
real automation hardware and commodity machines provides
the best trade-off between minimizing costs and staying close
to real-world deployments. Additionally, the physical devices
such as the warning light help immensely when demoing
the testbed to people who are not completely familiar with
the OT world. For example, a red warning light that flashes
after an emergency button was pushed on the HMI provides
instant feedback and helps the viewer to understand what is
happening.
As mentioned above the virtual factory to be secured was
built with FACTORY I/O. The virtual factory, or the scenario
as it is called in FACTORY I/O, was explicitly designed to
include mostly independent production cells that are each
controlled by a single PLC (either OpenPLC or hardware).
On the one hand, this is close to the organization of real
production lines as it keeps each PLC program simpler. On
the other hand, this compartmentalization allows to add more
distinct PLCs to the network to assess more complex attacks.
The communication between the PLCs and FACTORY I/O
is performed via the Modbus protocol as it is a common
denominator between OpenPLC and the Siemens S7. As
FACTORY I/O only supports a single client we bridged the
PLCs via a Modbus server, that runs on one RaspberryPI.
Abbildung 3 shows the four production cells that we designed
and combined in FACTORY I/O.
These four production cells cover some common use-cases
in real factories while also including some components that
can be visibly manipulated in an attack, e.g., a Pick-and-Place
crane in the Combine cell and the conveyor belts connecting
all cells. These component were included due to our testbed’s
focus on demonstrability.
B. Attack Simulation
We designed and implemented three kinds of attacks on the
OT testbed. All attacks assume the attacker is already inside
the target network, has network access, and can do a scan
Figure 3. Overview across the four production cells in the FACTORY I/O
scenario
of the subnet to find the target devices. While external attacks
could also be considered through a firewall and separate subnet
or VLAN, this is not the focus of the testbed.
• Denial of Service (DoS) via a TCP-SYN flood on a PLC
• Sabotage via a forged Modbus packet to manipulate
internal state of production hardware
• Man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack to eavesdrop on factory
communication and eventually transparently take over the
whole factory
Before implementing these attacks, we performed a small
evaluation of how attackers usually first gather intel about
the target systems by scanning the subnet. As Modbus is
transmitted over TCP/IP, nmap1 can be used to detect open
ports in a subnet. In our tests we could reliably verify this
before implementing the attacks.
One of the most common forms of attack is the DoS. In a
production setup the overload and subsequent shutdown of a
single machine can in worst case stop the complete production
process and is thus an easy way for an attacker to cause great
financial damage to an organization. We performed a simple
DoS by flooding a target PLC with TCP-SYN packets via
hping (shown in Listing 1).
$ hping3 -S -d 120 -p 502 --flood <target-ip>
Listing 1. Example command for a simple TCP-SYN flood DoS via hping
The arguments for hping set the TCP-SYN flag (-S),
set the destination port to the common Modbus port 502
(-p 502) and enable flooding (--flood). The results on
the virtual factory were as expected. The production cell that
was controlled by the targetted PLC was completely stopped
as the PLC was unable to reply to the Modbus requests of
FACTORY I/O. While simple, this attack already shows that
internal attackers can cause big damage with minimal effort.
However a sophisticated attacker might not chose this attack
in a real-world scenario as it can be easily detected on the
network side, if security monitoring is in place.
1https://nmap.org
Furthermore, we implemented a sabotage attack via the
forgery of Modbus packets. The basic idea is to send a
specially crafted Modbus packet and influence the production
hardware (usually Modbus clients) by corrupting their internal
state. Of course, this attack is only possible as Modbus
offers no built-in authentication or other protection against
unauthorized command execution. One example for this is
the Pick-and-Place crane in the Combine production cell
(see: Unterabschnitt IV-A). To achieve this, we used the
auxiliary/scanner/scada/modbusclient module
from Metasploit. Listing 2 shows an example script to
attack the Pick-and-Place crane in this fashion.
$ msfconsole -x
"use auxiliary/scanner/scada/modbusclient; \
set RHOST 192.168.1.62; \
set RPORT 502; \
set UNIT_NUMBER 0; \
set ACTION WRITE_COILS; \
set DATA_ADDRESS 34; \
set DATA_COILS 1; \
run;"
Listing 2. Modbus-based sabotage attack via msfconsole
This attack demonstrates how an intruder can stealthily
manipulate coils in a Modbus client. Depending on the ex-
act coil this can have big consequences as machines, e.g.,
degrade more quickly in a modified environment leading to
an unexpected production stop when the machine has to be
replaced or repaired. As FACTORY I/O is somewhat limited
in which machines it can simulate the attack on the Pick-and-
Place crane in our scenario is easily detected in the factory.
The attack misplaces the arm of the crane by 90 degrees and
as a result the whole cell is blocked.
Finally, we also designed a Man-in-the-Middle attack via
ettercap. First, ettercap uses ARP cache-poisoning to
route traffic over itself. This allows the attacker to eavesdrop
on all traffic in the subnet as Modbus in its default configura-
tion is not encrypted. Afterwards ettercap’s filter function
can be used to manipulate traffic at will. Listing 3 shows one
such filter that reverses the direction of some conveyor belts
in the virtual factory.
if (ip.proto == TCP && tcp.dst == 502) {
if (search(DATA.data, "\xff\xce")) {
replace("\x00\x00\x00\xfa",
"\xfb\x1d\xfb\x1d");
replace("\x00\x32\x00\x00\x00\x00",
"\xfb\x1d\xfb\x1d\xfb\x1d");
replace("\x00\xfa", "\xfb\x1d");
replace("\x00\x32", "\xfb\x1d");
replace("\xff\xce", "\x01\xfa");
}
}
Listing 3. ettercap filter to reverse direction of conveyor belts
First, the filter checks that the inspected traffic is TCP and
on destination port 502 (the default Modbus port). Then the
payload of the packet is matched against a specific byte pattern
0xFFCE. This pattern are FACTORY I/O specific and identify
the Modbus message that sets the speed of the conveyor belts.
We identified this pattern by monitoring the traffic similar to
what an attacker would do. If both conditions are met, the filter
transparently replaces the bytes responsible for controlling the
speed of the conveyor belts to 0xFB1D (equals -1521 in
two’s complement) effectively reversing their direction. The
multiple replace calls are required to catch all possible
states the conveyor belts can be in.
This attack highlights how an attacker can eavesdrop on all
communication inside a subnet and latter effectively rewrite all
traffic relayed through their machine. The belt filter massively
impacts the production process and results in work materials
flying through the factory. While this was only an example,
it clearly highlights that a Man-in-the-Middle attacker can
control the whole factory and manipulate all devices (given
they know the correct Modbus coils and values).
C. Security Monitoring
To monitor the OT network we developed an anomaly
detection component that ingests Modbus traffic from the
network via the mirror port of the switch. As our main
goal was to evaluate new monitoring solutions we did not
include a firewall or any other active component. All network
data is buffered to disk by tShark and then processed in
python programs. For analysis we considered two approaches,
namely statistical anomaly detection and machine learning.
Statistical anomaly detection proved to be difficult to apply as
it valid changes in the communication patterns are not easy to
distinguish from attacks. Therefore, we will detail the machine
learning approaches in the following.
By parsing the network data we get several attributes from
IP and TCP headers and the timing of the packets. We applied
the k-means algorithm to cluster the data by frame number,
time, time interval from previous packet, TCP sequence num-
ber, TCP acknowledgement number, TCP window size, source
IP-address, source port, destination IP-address, and destination
port. The results show that it is easy to cluster the data as a
lot of values are repeated quite often. However, it is not that
easy to find outliers resulting from attacks. By testing different
subsets of attributes, we found that the combination of frame
length, source port, destination port, and transaction identifier
(modbus) gives far better results and attacks are clearly visible
as outliers as Figure 4 shows.
We also experimented with a neural network, namely a
recurrent neural network (RNN) that allows to process normal
attributes and timing information. We encountered some prob-
lems due to the amount of data required for training and the
high configuration and tuning effort. Nethertheless, the RNN
is able to correctly classify about 85% of the traces as either
normal or anomaly and other algorithms might perform better.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we showed a concept for a OT testbed to
evaluate cyber attacks, possible counter measures and miti-
Figure 4. Example results for k-means with a subset of attributs and two
outliers indicating attacks.
gations. By using commodity hardware in combination with a
virtualized factory through FACTORY I/O, the testbed remains
portable and cost-effective, but can be combined with real
automation hardware if desired. We implemented a variant of
this concept with RaspberryPis and a Siemens PLC with a
focus on ease of demonstration.
Our implementation proved to be very cost-effective and
highlights three important ways an attacker can influence the
production process. FACTORY I/O is great for visualizing ma-
licious impact in a factory, as flying materials and missguided
crane arms are clearly recognizable as problems. To be able
to connect multiple hetergenous PLCs with FACTORY I/O
the Modbus-based approach proved useful. We plan to extend
this work by performing more attacks and implementing better
monitoring and attack-detection approaches.
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